Written By: Apoorv Agarwal, Gaurav Sarkar
The philosophy of modern criminal jurisprudence is anchored in the preservation of the individual’s liberty against the sanctioned machinery of the state. As John Locke articulated in his Two Treatises of Government (1689):
“The end of Law is not to abolish or restrain, but to preserve and enlarge Freedom: For in all the states of created beings capable of Laws, where there is no law, there is no Freedom.”
Personal liberty stands as the most cherished object of the Indian Constitution. To prevent arbitrary and prolonged detention of the under trial, the Indian law provides a vital safeguard known as statutory bail or default bail. Section 167 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (“CrPC”), now Section 187 of the Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023 (“BNSS”) provides an accused an absolute right to bail if the investigating agency fails to conclude its probe and file a chargesheet within the stipulated 60 or 90 days.
Section 58 of the BNSS prohibits police detention beyond 24 hours without a warrant or production before a Magistrate. Section 187 of the BNSS constitutes the statutory continuation of such detention, prescribing the 60/90-day limit to secure both expeditious investigation and trial, and protection against prolonged pre-trial incarceration.
While the theoretical value of liberty is absolute, its practical survival often hinges on an inviolable technicality: How do we count the days in custody?
A critical legal debate frequently arises regarding the exact computation of the statutory 60 or 90 days when the the time of filing the Chargesheet is not specified in BNSS. Specifically, does the deadline expire precisely at 12 am midnight, or is it bound by court working hours and calendar days? The Supreme Court of India clarified a significant portion of this issue in Enforcement Directorate v. Kapil Wadhawan, (2024) 7 SCC 147. A three judge bench ruled that the date of remand must be included when computing the statutory period. The court explicitly noted that the very moment the statutory period expires, meaning exactly at 12 am midnight, an indefeasible right to default bail immediately accrues to the accused
However, the interplay between midnight deadlines and court working hours introduces further interpretation of the period for filing of the Chargesheet. The statutory period includes all calendar days, not merely court working days. Furthermore, investigating agencies cannot exploit the 12 am midnight deadline if the court registry has already closed. The Kerala High Court in Aboobacker Siddique v. State of Kerala, Bail Application 1503 of 2026 addressed this exact scenario involving electronic filing. In that case, the police filed the chargesheet electronically at 6:02 PM on the final sixtieth day. The court ruled that under the relevant electronic filing rules read with criminal practice rules, any document submitted after the court working hours of 5:00 PM is legally reckoned as filed on the next working day. Consequently, the filing fell beyond the statutory limit, and the accused was granted default bail.
Similarly, the excuse of court holidays cannot be used to bypass this strict time frame. The Madhya Pradesh High Court in Armaan Hussain v. Union of India, 2026 SCC OnLine MP 6299 emphatically held that if the final day for filing the chargesheet falls on a holiday, the period does not extend to the next working day. To comply with the mandatory provisions, the investigating officer must submit the chargesheet before the available duty magistrate. If they fail to do so and file it when the court reopens, the accused immediately becomes entitled to default bail regardless of the merits of the case.
The above-mentioned precedents consistently demonstrate that the right to default bail cannot be frustrated by administrative delays or judicial holidays. As highlighted by the Supreme Court in Gautam Navlakha v. NIA, (2022) 13 SCC 542, the right to statutory bail arises irrespective of the merits of the case and must be recognized as a fundamental right intrinsically linked to Article 21 of the Constitution. Furthermore, the historical judgment in Chaganti Satyanarayana v. State of AP 1986 3 SCC 141 established early on that the period begins running purely from the date of the remand.
In conclusion, the right accrues immediately upon the expiry of the last calendar day. Any delay in filing the charge sheet beyond 5:00 p.m. on a working day, or its deferment until after an intervening holiday, is viewed with strict judicial scrutiny and may result in the indefeasible right to default bail crystallising in favour of the accused.
Interpreting ambiguity in law in Favour of the Accused
Kapil Wadhawan (supra) reinforces a foundational principle of constitutional law for protection of the individual against state disparity.
In Kapil Wadhawan (supra), the Supreme Court says that, “whenever there is any ambiguity in the construction of a penal statute, the Courts must favour the interpretation which leans towards protecting the rights of the accused, given the ubiquitous power disparity between an individual and the State.”
This is not merely a statutory rule but a constitutional imperative. The “Doctrine of Interoperability of Rights” enshrined under Articles 14, 19, and 21 of the Constitution creates an “interconnected web of liberty.” As our jurisprudence evolved from A.K. Gopalan v. State of Madras, 1950 SCC 228 to Maneka Gandhi v. Union of India, (1978) 1 SCC 248, the Supreme Court established that any law depriving a person of liberty must be just, fair, and reasonable. When two views are possible, the interpretation that upholds personal liberty must prevail.
The Ld. Chief Judicial Magistrate, Saket Courts, Delhi in case titled as State vs. Satya Prakash Bagla recently granted default bail to the accused relying upon the law laid down by the Supreme Court, Madhya Pradesh High Court and Kerala High Court. The Economic Offences Wing, Delhi arrested Satya Prakash Bagla on 09.01.2026, and his first remand commenced on 10.01.2026. Despite the passage of the mandatory 90 days, the investigating agency failed to submit the final report. Recognizing this lapse, the Ld. Chief Judicial Magistrate, South, Saket Courts, Delhi acknowledged that his right to default bail had crystallized and admitted him to bail.
In State v. Satya Prakash Bagla, the Court’s computation explicitly applied these rules:
| Event | Date |
| Date of Arrest | 09.01.2026 |
| Date of First Remand (Day 1) | 10.01.2026 |
| Released on 90th day on interim bail | 09.04.2026 |
| 90-Day Period Ends | 06.06.2026 |
| Right to Default Bail Accrues (91st Day) | 07.06.2026 |
In the Bagla’s case, the accused was granted “interim medical bail” for a period of his detention. However, the “remand clock” continued to run regardless. This proves that the statutory deadline is an absolute limitation on the State’s power to investigate, not a measure of the physical days spent inside a cell.
In conclusion, the indefeasible right to default bail constitutes a vital constitutional safeguard flowing from Article 21 of the Constitution. It is not a mere statutory concession, but an essential facet of the guarantee of personal liberty, designed to protect individuals against arbitrary and prolonged incarceration pending investigation. By mandating unwavering adherence to the statutory timelines prescribed for completing investigation, the law strikes a careful balance between the State’s interest in effective criminal prosecution and the individual’s fundamental right to liberty. Any failure on the part of the investigating agency to comply with these mandatory timelines attracts the statutory consequence of default bail, thereby reinforcing the constitutional mandate that deprivation of personal liberty must be strictly in accordance with the procedure established by law. The doctrine thus serves as a powerful check against investigative lethargy, executive excess, and indefinite pre-tril detention, affirming that procedural safeguards are indispensable to the administration of criminal justice and the preservation of the rule of law.